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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
International coordination of national regulations has been an integral part of the establishment of
the European Common Market.  This is also true in the case of product standard arrangements,
where currently three alternatives are prevalent within the EU.  Full Harmonization, where uniform
standards are set for all member countries, is the goal of the directives on harmonization of
standards contained in the EC Commission's (1985) White paper.  In all other cases, as a rule the
Country-of-Origin principle (or principle of Mutual Recognition) applies.  This means that
governments set standards for their national industries only while recognizing the adequacy of
foreign standards on imported products.  National (destination-oriented) treatment of product
standards is permitted under certain circumstances as exception to the rule. The current state of EU
regulations is exemplified by its Standards, CE Marking and "New Approach" Directives, which
continued the initiatives of the 1985 White paper.
However, support for the harmonization of standards such as minimum standards concerning
product quality, safety, or environmental protection, varies considerably within the EU. In part, this
is based on the common belief that these standards, when binding for less advanced national
industries but not for more advanced national industries, lead to increased market shares for the
latter.  Therefore, some of the economically weaker members in the EU fear economic
disadvantages from harmonized standards.  A similar reasoning applies to destination-oriented
standards despite the fact that they allow for national differences in the degree of regulation.  Here,
national standards might be used to prevent market entry by less advanced foreign industries.  In
contrast to these standard arrangements, the Country-of-Origin principle allows national regulation
only for domestically manufactured products.  But in this case, the more advanced national
industries might fear to be disadvantaged by higher standards imposed on them by their own
governments.  On the other hand, all consumers may benefit from increased product qualities caused
by standards.
This paper presents a comparison of the effects of the three alternative standard-setting
arrangements on national welfare, industry profits and consumers´ welfare using a two-country
model of imperfect competition.  The model includes restricting assumptions to capture stylized
facts about the EU.  The analysis captures some of the most important aspects of European markets.
National industries bear quality-dependend product development costs, choose different quality
levels, and compete by setting prices in two segmented national markets.  Trade takes place, since
both industries are present in both markets.  Since increased differentiation in terms of quality
decreases competition between rival products, higher quality products will coexist with lower
quality products, even if all firms were identical.  However, in the presence of technological
differences, high-quality products will normally be provided by national industries with low product
development costs.  Without regulation, equilibrium qualities and prices will not be optimal due to
imperfect competition.  In response to quality standards, qualities rise, quality differentiation is
reduced, and prices adjusted for quality fall.  This tends to increase welfare while reducing industry
profits.
Under either standard-setting alternative, standards can always be found that increase welfare in
both regions.  The analysis above is therefore extended to integrate the choice of a particular
standard setting alternative by governments and the subsequent setting of standards into the model.
Mutual Recognition emerges as one regulatory alternative that always improves welfare in both
regions when compared to the case without regulation.  Since the economically disadvantaged
region always prefers Mutual Recognition over all available alternatives and this is the default in
the first stage of the game, this is also the only possible equilibrium outcome of the game.  Reported
results with respect to the other standard arrangements change with changes in relative costs, i.e.
technological country differences.
These results suggest that the Country-of-Origin Principle is the most preferrable alternative.  There
are two main reasons for that.  First, it is the only standard arrangement that unambiguously
increases welfare of both regions irrespective of technological country differences.  Second, it does
not lead to the exit of industries from national markets.
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Abstract
I study the influence of minimum quality standards in a partial-equilibrium model of vertical
product differentiation and trade in which duopolistic firms face quality-dependent costs and
compete in quality and price in two segmented markets.  Three alternative standard setting
arrangements are Full Harmonization, National Treatment and Mutual Recognition.  Under either
alternative, standards can be found that increase welfare in both regions.  The analysis integrates the
choice of a particular standard setting alternative by governments into the model.  Mutual
Recognition emerges as one regulatory alternative that always improves welfare in both regions
when compared to the case without regulation.  Under certain cost conditions, both regions will
prefer Mutual Recognition over all available alternatives.
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International Coordination of Quality Standards and Vertical Product Differentiation1
1.  Introduction
Questions about economic integration in the presence of market imperfections have gained new
importance since the advent of the European Common Market.  This is exemplified by the ongoing
implementation of directives on harmonization of standards. The current state of EU regulations is
exemplified by its Standards, CE Marking and "New Approach" Directives2, which continued the
initiatives of the EU Commission's (1985) White paper.
However, support for the harmonization of standards, especially minimum standards concerning
product quality, safety, or environmental protection, varies considerably within the EU.  On one
hand, the Association of German Chambers of Industry and Commerce [DIHT (1988)] stresses the
importance of harmonized standards for several areas of industrial policy and recommends
transitionally adjustment measures.3  Not surprisingly, the German industry has traditionally
favored uniform standards, whereas other EU countries have opposed them.  This is based on the
common belief that these standards, when binding for less advanced national industries but not for
more advanced national industries, lead to increased market share for the latter.   On the other hand,
some of the economically weaker members in the EU would only agree to the Common Market
program in exchange for massive subsidy promises.4  In fact, the EU currently utilizes three
alternative ways of handling standards.  These arrangements are: Full Harmonization, where
                                                
1 I would like to thank Dan Kovenock, Massimo Motta and Georg Licht for helpful comments and suggestions. The
usual Disclaimer applies.
2 See, e.g., http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/standard/standard.htm (24 June 2003).
3Some of these are food and drug laws, harmonization of technical standards, environmental protection standards,
consumer protection, product liability,  reciprocal recognition of university degrees, general vocational training policies,
and harmonization of regulation of services such as insurance or telecommunication.  DIHT identifies all these areas as
contributing to the potentially costly segmentation of the European regional market.
4See, for example, Franzmeyer (1989), p. 313.
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uniform standards are set for all member countries; Mutual Recognition, where governments set
standards for their own industries and recognize the adequacy of each others’ standards; and
National Treatment, where governments apply national standards to any product sold within their
country.5   This gives rise to questions about the relative effects of different standard setting
procedures and in particular about the possibility to regulate standards in such a way that the
economically weaker regions do not take welfare losses.  This paper will address some of these
questions.
The model to be developed below will represent some stylized facts about economic
asymmetries within the EU.  More precisely, the EU will be divided into two regions, labeled core
and periphery, respectively.  The core will be characterized by a larger market, higher per-capita
income, lower cost of producing or developing products of a certain level of quality, and the ability
to generally produce products of higher quality than the periphery.  Industry structure will be
duopolistic.  Regional governments, as members of an interregional council, either unanimously
choose one of three alternative standard setting procedures or a default procedure takes effect.
Following, for example, Smith and Venables (1988) or Venables (1990), we can identify
France, Germany, Italy and Great Britain as the core, and the rest of the EU as periphery.  Using this
categorization, the following can be said about core and periphery, respectively.  Within the EU, the
core accounts for about 60% of total area, 70% of total population, and 80% of total Gross
Domestic Product.  Per-capita income is on average approximately 60% higher in the core than in
                                                
5Full Harmonization, the main goal until the late 1970s, will be constrained to essential safety and health requirements.
In all other cases, Mutual Recognition of national standards applies.  This approach was substantially furthered by recent
decisions of the European Court.  It has also been embraced in the Commission’s White Paper.  However, the Single
European Act provided a caveat to Mutual Recognition in Article 100A(4), which allows single governments to apply
National Treatment “... on grounds of major needs referred to in Article 36 ...”  These major needs include, among
others, public morality and the protection of commercial property.
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peripheral countries.6  Core countries account for over 75% of the EU’s total R&D expenditure,
patents, and high-technology exports.7  Manufacturing accounts for approximately 70% of intra-EU
trade and intra-EU trade accounts for about 60% of total EU trade.  Industries providing products
with  medium to high technology content and requiring high R&D efforts or investments within the
EU are, for example, medical devices and specialties, telecommunications, automated machines for
data processing, office equipment, computers, and automobiles.  These industries largely exhibit
oligopolistic structures, often, as in the case of automobiles, operate in segmented national markets
and, in some cases such as automobiles and computers, engage in intensive price competition.8
Furthermore, they are also targeted by the legislative directives on harmonization of standards
introduced in the  EU Commission’s (1985) White Paper.9
According to Nevin (1990, p. 32), the Council of Ministers of the European Communities is
the “... sole effective centre of power in the [EU’s administrative] system.”10  The Council of
Ministers consists of representatives of the governments of the member states.  Each government
normally sends one of its ministers, according to the subject to be discussed.  The Council ensures
the coordination of the Community’s general economic policies and makes decisions necessary for
carrying out the treaties.  It  also makes the final decisions on all important issues.  Its main
instruments used are regulations and directives.  Regulations become immediately effective in all
affected member states whereas directives bind affected member governments to adopt national
legislation.  Qualified majority voting is permitted in certain policy areas, while unanimity is
                                                
6These and the following stylized facts can be verified using readily available data sources such as Basic Statistics of the
Community (EU-Commission), International Financial Statistics (IMF) and Statistics of Foreign Trade (OECD).
7This is reported in Papagni (1992).
8See, for example, Clement (1989) and Cecchini (1988).
9COM (85), 310 final.  If the White Paper describes the planned changes in Community regulation, then the resulting
gains, from the view of the Commission, are most comprehensively described in the Cecchini (1988) Report.
10Nevin takes this citation from the Vedel Report of 1972 and elaborates that “... this remains an accurate summary of
the realities of the situation.”
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required in others.  The voting allocations in the Council are such that the core has 40 votes and the
periphery has 36 votes.  A qualified majority consists of 54 votes.  In addition, at least 8 countries
must vote in favor of proposals not emanating from the Commission of the European
Communities.11  The legislative directives on harmonization of standards introduced in the  EU
Commission’s (1985) White Paper will eventually all be submitted to the Council for final decision.
If we assume that core countries and peripheral countries respectively represent homogenous
interests, unanimous decision making in the Council can be taken as a stylized fact describing
decisions about standard setting on the Community level.   Based on Articles 100A and 30 of the
EEC-Treaty and current rulings of the European Court, Mutual Recognition of standards can be
seen as the default ruling in the EU.  The facts presented above build the basis for the stylistic
features of the model developed below.
In both the fields of industrial organization and of international trade, there are fairly large
bodies of literature focusing on product quality.  Some of this literature investigates the effects of
minimum quality standards [e.g., Leland (1979), Shapiro (1983), Besanko/Donnenfeld/White
(1988), Das/Donnenfeld (1989), Ronnen (1991), Copeland (1992)].  But to my knowledge, the
existing literature does not yet cover the analytical treatment of simultaneous standard-setting by
governments when two-way trade occurs.  However, this is a prerequisite to discussing the
problems raised above.  The basic features of models of quality differentiation with monopolistic
competition have been well known for some time.  Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) developed a
framework for quality preferences where consumers with identical tastes but different income levels
demand different quality levels.  They analyzed the Cournot-duopoly equilibrium and showed its
dependence on the income distribution and quality parameters.  Shaked and Sutton (1982) showed
that in the case of duopolists that first choose quality and then compete in price, the equilibrium
will include both firms entering with distinct quality levels enjoying positive profits, i.e., they
                                                
11See, for example, Sbragia (1992, p. 293) and Nevin (1990, p. 34).
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demonstrated how quality differences relax price competition.  Ronnen (1991) uses Shaked and
Sutton’s framework to demonstrate cases where quality standards improve welfare.  He concludes
that there exists a binding minimum quality standard such that all consumers are weakly better off,
both firms have positive profits, and total welfare is increased.  However, since there is only one
market, there is no scope for strategic government interaction in this model.  Similarly, other
literature lacks either the element of strategic government interaction or the element of two-way
trade.  For example, Das and Donnenfeld (1989) study the influence of minimum quality standards
and quotas in a model in which a foreign firm and a domestic firm compete in qualities and
quantities in the domestic market.  The home government unilaterally chooses a trade policy.  A
quota will lead to positive protection, whereas a minimum quality standard will result in negative
protection and a decrease of national welfare.  Existing comparisons between different standard
setting procedures, such as in Copeland (1992), are subject to similar restrictions.  Copeland studies
the influence of minimum quality standards under three different standard setting arrangements in a
model in which a foreign and a domestic firm compete in quality and quantity in the home market
while the foreign firm is the sole supplier in the foreign market.  Hence, the home country is only
importing and the foreign country is only exporting.  Each country imposes a quality standard to
control an externality generated by the products.  Both countries have an incentive to use standards
as a protective measure.  The intervention results obtained depend on the particular standard-setting
arrangement chosen.
The model employed extends the framework of Shaked/Sutton and Ronnen for the two-
country case, i.e. it is a partial-equilibrium model of vertical product differentiation and trade in
which duopolistic firms face quality-dependent fixed costs and compete in quality and price in two
segmented markets.  First, I model a two-stage industry game in pure strategies.  In the first stage,
firms simultaneously determine quality to be produced.  In the second stage, firms compete in
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prices, given their quality choice.  There exist at most two unregulated equilibria12.  In either
equilibrium, one firm sells high quality whereas the other sells low quality.  The resulting market
equilibrium will generally not be optimal from the point of view of either regional government,
since governments will prefer higher quality levels than those chosen in equilibrium.  However, the
nature of governments' choices will depend on the standard setting procedure agreed upon.  Under
Full Harmonization of standards, there always exists some minimum quality standard that will
increase welfare in both regions.  If such a standard is set, all consumers will be (weakly) better off
and producers’ profits will generally decrease.  If a minimum quality standard is set close to low
quality, however, the low-quality producer's profits will increase.  Two other alternatives to Full
Harmonization are National Treatment and Mutual Recognition.  Under either alternative, standards
can always be found that increase welfare in both regions.  The analysis above is therefore extended
to integrate the unanimous choice of a particular standard setting alternative by governments and
the subsequent setting of standards into the model.  This allows a comparison of the effects of
alternative standard setting procedures.
I extend the basic model to be a four-stage game in pure strategies.  In the first stage, both
governments, as members of an interregional council, announce one choice out of three alternative
standard setting procedures.  These alternatives are:  (1) National Treatment, (2) Full
Harmonization, and (3) Mutual Recognition (the default procedure).  If the two announcements
coincide the particular procedure will be applied, otherwise the default procedure takes effect.  The
governments' role in the second stage depends on the first-stage outcome:  under alternative (1)
governments maximize regional social welfare by noncooperatively setting regional standards;
under alternative (2) the council maximizes the sum of regional welfares by setting one uniform
                                                
12These equilibria are in pure strategies.  If there are two pure-strategy equilibria, there also exists at least one mixed-
strategy equilibrium.  However, the analysis of mixed-strategy equilibria is beyond the scope of this work.
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standard13; and under alternative (3) governments maximize regional social welfare by
noncooperatively setting producer standards.  The industry game described earlier builds the third
and fourth stages of this game.
Mutual Recognition emerges as one regulatory alternative that always improves welfare in
both regions when compared to the case without regulation.  Since the foreign region always prefers
Mutual Recognition over all other available alternatives and this is the default in the first stage of
the game, this is also the only possible equilibrium outcome of the game.14  If the domestic firm
has a sufficiently large cost advantage, then the domestic region will also prefer Mutual
Recognition over all available alternatives.
2.  A Model of Vertical Product Differentiation15
2.1. Basic Model
I use a two-country (or, two-region), partial-equilibrium model of vertical product
differentiation.  The model describes a two-stage game with firms interacting simultaneously in
both stages.16  To derive solutions, I use the concept of subgame-perfect equilibrium, computing
the solutions for each stage in reverse order.  There are two separate regions, the "domestic region"
(D) and the "foreign region" (F).17  There are two firms, the "domestic firm" (d) is located in the
domestic region and the "foreign firm" (f) is located in the foreign region.  Each firm produces a
                                                
13Maximizing the sum of regional welfares can be seen as the outcome of Nash-Bargaining between both governments
in the Council.
14Note that there at least three and at most seven Nash equilibria depending on  relative costs.
15 The following analysis is based on Lutz (1996).
16In what follows, terms within quotation marks will denote names to be used in the analysis.  The corresponding
symbols to be used for short-hand notation will  be added in parentheses.  As a convention, I will use subscripts to
denote regions, firms and high/low (in quality).  E. g., pFd is the price of the domestic firm in the foreign market  and sh
is high quality offered.
17The regions D and F can be interpreted as core and periphery, respectively.
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single variety of a quality-differentiated product.  Products are differentiated on the basis of a single
attribute, "quality" (s).  When the qualities provided differ, we refer to them as "high" (h) quality
and "low" (o) quality, respectively.    Both firms have constant marginal cost (equal to zero) in
quantity  produced.  However, they have to incur a "cost of providing quality" (k) before entering
into production.  Costs are increasing, convex (quadratic) functions of quality provided. The exact
level of cost depends on quality chosen and a "quality cost parameter" (b).  The domestic firm has a
technological advantage in developing quality, i.e., it has a lower quality cost parameter than the
foreign firm. Total costs of firm i are then given by:
(1) k b si i i2
The domestic market is larger than the foreign market and shows  a preference for higher
quality.  The two  product markets are regionally segmented.  The product qualities are known to all
consumers.  Each consumer may purchase at most one unit of a product of either high or low
quality.  We assume consumers have identical ordinal preferences across regions and differ only in
their incomes.  The population is equal to one in the foreign region and greater than one (equal to
two) in the domestic region.  Populations can be ordered according to an "income parameter" (t),
where t is uniformly distributed over the intervals [0, 2]  and [0, 1] in the domestic and foreign
regions, respectively.18   Under our assumption, the income parameter t represents the inverse of
consumers' marginal rate of substitution between income and quality  -  wealthier consumers have a
lower marginal utility of income (which means a higher t), they prefer higher quality products.
Hence, we can use t when referring to single consumers or segments of consumers.  Expenditure on
the product, i.e., price (p), is small relative to income. Hence, consumer i's preference can be
represented by:19
                                                
18This also implies that the domestic region has higher per capita income than the foreign region.
19For the derivation of utility and demand see, for example, Tirole (1988, pp. 96, 97).
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(2) U
t s p    if one unit of quality s  at price p  is purchased
0 otherwise
i i i i i




In the first stage, firms determine quality to be produced.  In the second stage, firms compete
in prices, taking their quality choice as given. Model components and their behavior are derived in
detail in Lutz (1996, 1997) and the appendix.
2.2 Minimum Quality Standards
           The model introduced in the previous section generally has two equilibria in quality.  Profit
and consumer surplus for each equilibrium can be expressed in the following way:
(3a)  
 
PI
20s s s
4s s
b sh
h
2
h o
h o
2 h h
2


 
 (3b)  
 
PI
5s s s s
4s s
b so
h o h o
h o
2 o o
2




(4)  
 
CS 4CS
2s 4s 5s
4s s
D F
h
2
h l
h o
2 

 
           Regional welfare is just the sum of regional consumer surplus and the profit of the firm
located in that region.  Total welfare is then the sum of the welfare in both regions.  Although
welfare can only be calculated after determining which firm provides high quality and which
provides low quality, some welfare results can be obtained that hold in either quality equilibrium.
           The qualities chosen in an unregulated equilibrium will generally not be optimal from the
point of view of either government.  Moreover, it can be shown that both governments prefer higher
quality levels than those chosen in a market equilibrium (see the appendix).  In both regions, an
increase of either quality will lead to increases of consumer surplus at increasing rates.  This leads
to the result in Lemma 1.
           Lemma 1.  a) Given an unregulated quality equilibrium, regional welfare of both regions can
be increased by increasing either or both qualities.
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           b) There exists a single standard that, if imposed in both regions, would increase welfare of
both regions.
           (Proof see the appendix.)
2.3.  The Four-Stage Game
In this section we extend the model introduced above to include standard-setting
governments.  The extended model describes a four-stage game with regional governments (or their
representatives in a multinational council) interacting in the first two stages and firms interacting in
the third and fourth stages.  To derive solutions, I will again use the concept of subgame-perfect
equilibrium.  Each of the two separate regions, the "domestic region" (D) and the "foreign region"
(F), has an independent central government.  Both governments are members in the joint "Council."
Decisions by the Council are either made unanimously, i.e. both governments have to agree on the
choice made, or a previously chosen default rule applies.  Firms and consumers are as previously
introduced.
In the first stage, both governments, announce one choice out of three alternative standard
setting procedures.  These alternatives are:  (1) National Treatment (NT), which lets governments
simultaneously set minimum quality standards for their respective consumers; (2) Full
Harmonization (FH), which has the Council equalize standards across countries; and (3) Mutual
Recognition (MR), which lets governments simultaneously set minimum quality standards for their
respective producers (the default procedure).  If the two announcements coincide the particular
procedure will be applied, otherwise the default procedure takes effect.  The governments' role in
the second stage depends on the first-stage outcome:  under alternative (1) governments maximize
regional social welfare by noncooperatively setting regional (consumer) standards; under alternative
(2) the Council maximizes the sum of regional welfares by setting one uniform standard; and under
alternative (3) governments maximize regional social welfare by noncooperatively setting producer
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(firm) standards.  Under National Treatment, it is possible that one region sets a regional standard
that deters entry by the foreign producer leaving this producer to sell only in its home market.  This
case is included in the analysis, but a similar scenario under Full Harmonization is excluded by
assumption.  I obtain results under Full Harmonization assuming that the Council calculates its
standard best response conditional on both firms remaining in the market.  If a firm were to earn
negative profits at the so calculated Full-Harmonization solution, its government will pay a lump-
sum subsidy equal to minus profits if that firm stays in the market.20  The effects of removing this
assumption are discussed below together with the analysis of the Full-Harmonization case.  In the
third stage, firms simultaneously determine quality to be produced subject to minimum quality
constraints on either their productions or market access.  The domestic producer is assumed to have
a cost advantage guaranteeing a single pure-strategy industry-equilibrium such that it provides a
higher quality than its competitor.  In the last stage, firms compete in prices, given their quality
choice and possible market access constraints.
Several implications about the game can be deduced directly.  The default rule introduces
the possibility of at least three and at most seven outcome-equivalent equilibria where Mutual
Recognition takes effect.  Both governments announcing Mutual Recognition is always a Nash
equilibrium.  A sufficient condition for Mutual Recognition to be the only equilibrium outcome is
that at least one region strictly prefers it to the other two alternatives.  Necessary condition for
National Treatment to be an equilibrium is that both regions weakly prefer National Treatment to
Mutual Recognition.  An analogous condition applies for Full Harmonization.
3.  Full Harmonization vs. Mutual Recognition
3.1.  Full Harmonization
                                                
20Regional welfare is measured as the sum of consumer surplus and profits net of the subsidy.
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           Under the standard setting procedure of Full Harmonization, governments agree to set a
single minimum quality standard for both regions.  In this case, the council maximizes the sum of
regional welfares with respect to a minimum quality standard.  Since firm d is the high-quality
producer, this standard will be binding for the foreign firm but not for the domestic firm, since the
foreign firm stays in the market (by assumption).  This means that the council's problem can be
reduced to maximizing total welfare with respect to firm f's quality subject to the constraints that
firm f's profits must be nonnegative and that firm d operates on its quality reaction function.  Since
firm d moves along its quality best response as firm f is forced to increase its quality, firm d's profit
will be positive, but decreased.  Firm f's profit, however, may increase if the minimum quality
standard is sufficiently close to the unregulated market solution and decrease below zero if the
standard is high.  For tractability, the results below will be obtained assuming that the council
calculates its standard best response conditional on both firms remaining in the market.  If a firm
were to earn negative profits at the so calculated Full-Harmonization solution, its government will
pay a lump-sum subsidy equal to minus profits if that firm stays in the market.  (Regional welfare is
measured as the sum of consumer surplus and profits net of the subsidy.)  Results obtained in this
way overstate both qualities, total welfare and domestic welfare while understating foreign welfare.
The analysis of National Treatment (with accommodated entry) will provide an upper bound on
foreign welfare and the lower bounds on qualities, total welfare and domestic welfare.  Using the
true Full-Harmonization solution, i.e. removing the subsidy assumption will relax the conditions
under which the domestic region will prefer Mutual Recognition over Full Harmonization.  All
other welfare comparisons presented below will be essentially unchanged.
           Let dsd/dsf denote the slope of firm d's quality reaction function.  Note that firm d provides
high quality whereas firm f provides low quality.  Equation (5) describes then the change in firm f's
profits as sf is forced upward by a minimum quality standard.
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At equilibrium qualities, this change is positive since marginal revenue minus marginal cost of
quality is zero and the remaining terms on the RHS of equation (5) are both positive.  However, as
firm f's quality is forced up higher this change diminishes and eventually becomes negative.  In
other words, foreign profits along the domestic firm's quality best response are concave.
Differentiating the RHS of equation (5) with respect to sf  yields a negative expression. This is
verified in the appendix.  There exists a uniform standard that will make all consumers in both
regions weakly better off and some consumers strictly better off.  It can be shown that market
participation in both regions will increase, the segment of consumers buying high quality will
increase in both markets, and utility per unit bought will increase in both regions for both qualities.
This is done in the appendix.
           Under our assumptions, the Council's maximization problem has a unique solution even
though the objective function may not be strictly concave in sf.  Let firm d's marginal quality best
response be denoted by dsd/dsf .  Differentiating the objective function with respect to sf yields
equation (6).
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At unconstrained equilibrium qualities, this change is positive since marginal revenue minus
marginal cost of quality is zero for both firms, CSD/sf + Rd/sf > 0, and the remaining terms on
the RHS of equation (6) are all positive.  However, as sf is increased this change diminishes and
eventually becomes negative. At the choice of sf that sets the RHS of equation (6) equal to zero the
second derivative will be negative.  Under our assumptions, the Council's objective function has a
single extremum at which it is locally strictly concave.  This is verified in the appendix.
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           A harmonized standard will unambiguously increase domestic welfare and total welfare.
However, maximizing total welfare may include decreasing foreign welfare.  This is stated in
Proposition 1.
           Proposition 1.  Moving from no regulation (the unconstrained equilibrium) to Full
Harmonization will strictly increase both qualities, total welfare, and domestic welfare.  Foreign
welfare may be decreased.  Foreign (unsubsidized) profit will be negative.
           Proof.  Increases of both qualities and total welfare follow directly from equation (6) in
connection with the positive sign of the firm’s quality best response and the accompanying
discussion.  Marginal domestic welfare (with respect to a uniform standard), given by line two of
equation (6), is strictly positive for all pairs {sd, sf} on firm d's quality best response that lie
between the unregulated equilibrium and the equilibrium under Full Harmonization.  Hence,
domestic welfare increases.  Marginal foreign welfare, given by line one of equation (6) is first
positive and then negative along firm d's quality best response between the unregulated equilibrium
and the Full-Harmonization solution.  This is illustrated in the appendix.  The proof of the profit
result is also given in the appendix. QED
           In deriving the results above, we have postulated that the foreign firm stays in the market
with a positive quality.  Clearly, there are cases where this would not be optimal.  Consider the case
where the foreign cost parameter bf approaches infinity.  Foreign quality sf under no regulation will
approach zero.  Under Full Harmonization, a standard binding for the foreign firm will also
approach zero leaving the domestic firm to provide monopoly quality.  Welfare could then be
improved by setting a standard above the domestic firm's monopoly quality.  This case is likely to
arise whenever foreign costs are very large.
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3.2.  Mutual Recognition
Under the standard setting procedure of Mutual Recognition, governments noncooperatively
set producer standards for their respective firms and recognize the adequacy of each other's
standard.  In this case, each government maximizes regional welfare with respect to a minimum
quality standard, taking the other government's standard as given.  Both firms will face binding
standards.  This means that each government maximizes regional welfare with respect to its own
firm's quality to derive the regional standard best response.  The foreign government's maximization
problem has a unique solution since the objective function is strictly concave in sf.  Differentiating
the foreign government's objective function with respect to sf yields equation (30a).
(7a) d
ds
W (MR MC ) CS
 sf
F f f
F
f
  


The domestic government's objective function has a single extremum at which it is locally strictly
concave in sd.  Hence, the domestic government's maximization problem has a unique solution.
Differentiating the domestic government's objective function with respect to sd yields equation (7b).
(7b) d
ds
W (MR MC ) CS
 sd
D d d
D
d
  


Concavity properties of the governments' objective functions are verified in the appendix.
           Proposition 2.  Moving from no regulation to Mutual Recognition will strictly increase both
qualities and both regions' welfares.
           Proof.  In the absence of regulation, both firms equate marginal revenue with marginal cost.
This implies that the RHS of equations (7a) and (7b) are both greater than zero.  Hence, equations
(7a) and (7b) in connection with Lemma 1 establish that the domestic (foreign) standard best
response lies everywhere above (to the right of) the domestic (foreign) firm's unrestricted quality
best response.  It also follows that the move to Mutual Recognition can be replicated by: (A) a
move to the right along firm d's best quality response until the RHS of equation (7a) is equal to
zero; followed by (B) an upward move along the domestic regions standard best response until the
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RHS of equation (7b) is equal to zero.  Along (A), the RHS of equation (7a) decreases from
CSF/sf to zero, whereas the RHS of equation (7b) equals CSD/sd > 0.  Hence, by equation (6),
both regions' welfares increase.  Along (B), the RHS of equation (7b) decreases from CSD/sd to
zero, whereas the RHS of equation (7a) equals zero.  Here, any increase in domestic quality will
increase foreign welfare and marginal welfare.  The responding increase in foreign quality will
increase domestic welfare in spite of decreasing domestic revenue. QED
         Given price competition in the last stage of the game, a benchmark quality solution can be
derived by maximizing the sum of regional welfares, i.e. total welfare, with respect to both
qualities.  Maximizing total welfare with respect to a single quality results in a benchmark quality
best response.  Comparing these benchmark best responses to the standard best responses under
different regulatory regimes further illustrates quality distortions inherent in equilibria under these
regimes.  Lemma 1 already implied that this benchmark is to the Northeast of the unregulated
equilibrium.  In addition, Lemma 2 shows that this benchmark is to the Northwest of the
equilibrium under Full Harmonization and to the Northeast of the equilibrium under Mutual
Recognition.
           Lemma 2.  Define a benchmark as the result of maximizing the sum of regional welfares, W,
with respect to both qualities subject to subsequent price competition.
           a) At Full Harmonization, WD/sd = CSD/sd > 0.  Any horizontal move to the left (any
reduction in sf without reducing sd) will always leave WD/sd > 0.
           b) Compared to the benchmark, Full Harmonization will result in domestic quality being too
low and foreign quality being too high.
           c) Compared to the benchmark, Mutual Recognition will result in both domestic and foreign
quality being too low.
                      (Proof see the appendix.)
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Figure 1 depicts comparisons of the Mutual-Recognition quality equilibrium with the Full-
Harmonization equilibrium, the benchmark solution, and the unregulated equilibrium, respectively.
Note that parts b) and c) of Lemma 2 establish that sf at the Full Harmonization equilibrium is
higher than sf at the Mutual Recognition equilibrium.  Based on that result, part a) implies that sd at
the Mutual Recognition equilibrium must be higher than sd at the Full Harmonization equilibrium.
A move from Full Harmonization to Mutual Recognition involves a decrease in sf  and an increase
in sd.  The latter move increases both regions' welfare, but the former increases only foreign welfare
while decreasing domestic welfare.  This suggests that the foreign region will prefer Mutual
Recognition to Full Harmonization, but the domestic region may not.  In fact, the domestic region's
preference depends on relative cost.  For any finite bd, as bf approaches infinity the difference
between domestic welfare under Mutual Recognition and under Full Harmonization approaches a
positive finite limit.  In other words, if the domestic firm's cost advantage is large, i.e. bd is small
relative to bf, Mutual Recognition will lead to higher domestic welfare.  Let MR(bd, bf) and FH(bd,
bf) be the quality equilibria as functions of cost parameters under Mutual Recognition and Full
Harmonization, respectively.  Define g(bf) = {bd | WD|MR(bd, bf) = WD|FH(bd, bf)}.  The
domestic region will prefer Mutual Recognition if bd < g(bf).  This is illustrated in the appendix.
Proposition 3 below summarizes the results of comparing Mutual Recognition and Full
Harmonization.
Proposition 3.  Moving from Full Harmonization to Mutual Recognition will strictly
increase domestic quality, decrease foreign quality, and increase foreign welfare.  Domestic welfare
will be increased if firm d's cost advantage is large, i.e. if bd < g(bf).
           Proof.  The results with respect to qualities follow from Lemma 2.  Suppose that a uniform
standard was set at the optimal Full Harmonization level.  In this case, the RHS of equation (6) is
equal to zero and the domestic firm chooses its quality best response by equating its marginal
revenue and marginal cost.  This implies that the RHS of equation (7a) is less than zero, whereas
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the RHS of equation (7b) is greater than zero.  It follows that a gradual reduction of sf down to the
point where the RHS of equation (7a) equals zero, i.e. a horizontal move to the left, will increase
foreign welfare and decrease domestic welfare [by marginal properties of revenues and consumer
surplus].  At this point, the foreign region is on its standard best response, but the domestic region is
below its standard best response.  The RHS of equation (7b) will still be equal to  CSD/sd > 0.
Consequently, domestic welfare can be increased by raising domestic quality which, in turn, will
further increase foreign welfare.  Foreign welfare is unambiguously increased, whereas domestic
welfare is decreased by the reduction in foreign quality and increased by the increase in domestic
quality.  The lower the foreign cost disadvantage the less will foreign quality be decreased relative
to the increase in domestic quality, which results in condition g(bf). QED
4.  National Treatment
4.1.  Asymmetric Effects of Regional Standards
           Under the standard setting procedure of National Treatment, governments noncooperatively
set consumer standards for their respective regions and apply these standards to all imports.  In this
case, each government maximizes regional welfare with respect to a minimum quality standard,
taking the other government's standard as given.  With both firms entering in both markets, each
regional standard can only be binding, if at all, for the foreign firm.  Alternatively, if the domestic
standard is set high enough, it will deter entry by the foreign firm, since the domestic firm can
always tolerate a higher standard than the foreign firm.  In this case, the domestic standard will be
set to be binding for the domestic firm.  The domestic government prefers to set its regional
standard such that entry by the foreign firm is deterred if the domestic cost advantage is large.  This
result is based on the same tradeoff that underlies the domestic regions preference with regard to
Mutual Recognition and Full Harmonization.  Moving from National Treatment with
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accommodated entry to National Treatment with deterred entry involves an increase of domestic
quality and a decrease to zero of foreign quality in the domestic market.
             Let NTn(bd, bf) and NTe(bd, bf) be the quality equilibria as functions of cost parameters
under National Treatment with deterred entry and National Treatment with accommodated entry,
respectively.  Define h(bf) = {bd | WD|NTn(bd, bf) = WD|NTe(bd, bf)}.  The domestic region will
prefer National Treatment with deterred entry if bd < h(bf).  This leads to Lemma 3.
Lemma 3.  Under National Treatment, domestic welfare will be higher when entry of the
foreign firm is deterred than when entry is accommodated if firm d's cost advantage is large, i.e. if
bd < h(bf).
           (Proof. See the appendix.)
4.2.  National Treatment where the Foreign Firm Enters Both Markets
           When both firms enter both markets, each regional standard can only be binding for the
product with the lower quality, i.e. the foreign product.  The domestic government has the greater
incentive to set a high standard because of domestic consumers' greater willingness to pay for high
quality and the domestic firm's cost advantage.  Hence, the domestic standard will be binding,
whereas the foreign standard will not be binding.  It follows that the quality solution will lie on firm
d's quality best response, which allows for utilizing some results from the analysis of Full
Harmonization.  The domestic government has always the incentive to increase foreign quality, but
this will ultimately decrease foreign profits.  If the domestic standard was set at the Full-
Harmonization level, foreign profits would be negative.  The foreign firm will only enter the
domestic market if its profit from providing the higher quality in both markets is greater than or
equal to its profit from providing the lower quality in the foreign market only.  Consequently, the
domestic government will set a standard such that foreign profits when entry is accommodated just
equal foreign profits when entry is deterred.  The foreign government would also like to increase
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foreign quality along firm d's quality best response, but not as much as the domestic government.
Foreign welfare reaches a unique maximum along d's quality best response somewhere between the
unregulated quality equilibrium and the Full-Harmonization solution.  The foreign government can
affect the binding (domestic) quality standard only through measures affecting the foreign firm's
profits when entry is deterred, i.e. the foreign firm's minimum-profit requirement for entry.  This
means that the foreign standard will be set such that foreign profits with deterred entry are as close
as possible to foreign profits with accommodated entry at the point where foreign welfare is
maximized along firm d's quality best response.  If foreign profits with deterred entry are lower than
foreign profits with accommodated entry at the foreign-welfare-maximizing point of firm d's quality
best response, the foreign government sets its standard to maximize foreign profits with deterred
entry.  Let an added subscript n denote non-entry variables.  The foreign government's objective
function is then given by equation (8a-1).
(8a-1) sf = sf | PIfn = Min[Max[PIfn | MRdn = MCd],
 PIf | WF = Max[ WF | MRd = MCd]]
Let firm d's marginal quality best response when entry is deterred be denoted by dsd/dsf|n.  The
foreign government needs to calculate firm f's maximum profit when entry is deterred.
Differentiating the appropriate objective function with respect to sf yields equation (8a-2).
(8a-2) d
ds
PI (MR MC )
ds
ds
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f
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d
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
The foreign government also needs to find the point on firm d's quality best response when entry is
accommodated where foreign welfare is maximized, say MF.  Differentiating the appropriate
objective function with respect to sf yields equation (8a-3).
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Differentiating the domestic firm's objective function with respect to sf yields equation (8b).
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Since firm d is on its quality best response, the RHS of equation (31b) will always be positive.
Denote the minimum foreign profit required for entry as PIfmin.  The following inequality is a
binding constraint on the domestic government's objective function, since foreign profits decrease
as the domestic standard is increased.
(8c) PI PIf f
min

Consequently, the equilibrium under National Treatment with accommodated entry can be
calculated by maximizing domestic welfare along firm d's quality best response subject to
inequality (8c).  It will correspond to a point on firm d's quality best response to the right of the
unregulated equilibrium (NR) and to the left of the Full-Harmonization solution (FH).
Lemma 4.  Under National Treatment (with accommodated entry), the foreign government
will calculate foreign profits at the foreign welfare maximum along the domestic firm's quality best
response, say PIf|MF.  It will then set a standard such that PIf|FH < PIfn  PIf|MF.
                      (Proof. See the appendix.)
Proposition 4.  a) Moving from no regulation to National Treatment (with accommodated
entry) will strictly increase both qualities and domestic welfare.  Foreign welfare may be increased.
Moving from National Treatment (with accommodated entry) to Full Harmonization will strictly
increase both qualities and domestic welfare.  Foreign welfare may be decreased.
           b) Moving from National Treatment (with accommodated entry) to Mutual Recognition will
strictly increase domestic quality and strictly increase foreign welfare.  Foreign quality may increase
or decrease.  A sufficient condition for domestic welfare to increase is that bd < g(bf).
           Proof.  a) Increases of both qualities follow directly from Lemma 4, its proof and the
discussion above.  The welfare results follow then from Proposition 1 and its proof and examples in
the appendix.
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           b) At National Treatment, the RHS of equation (8a-3) is less than or equal to zero.  Hence,
the RHS of equation (7a) is less than or equal to zero.  Decreasing sf until the RHS of equation (7a)
equals zero while holding sd constant will increase foreign welfare while decreasing domestic
welfare.  At this point, the foreign region is on its standard best response, but the domestic region is
below its standard best response.  The rest of the proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 3.
QED
4.3.  National Treatment: Foreign Entry into the Domestic Market is Deterred
If the domestic cost advantage is large enough, then the domestic government prefers to set
its regional standard under National Treatment so high that foreign entry is deterred.  The increase
in regional welfare due to increased domestic quality more than offsets the welfare loss due to the
unavailability of the foreign product.  The problem faced by regional governments is similar to the
case of Mutual Recognition.  However, domestic welfare does not include consumer surplus
derived from the consumption of the foreign product and foreign welfare does not include profits
derived from selling to the domestic market.  The foreign government's objective function has a
single extremum at which it is locally strictly concave in sf.  Hence, the foreign government's
maximization problem has a unique solution.    Let an added subscript n denote non-entry variables.
Differentiating the foreign government's objective function with respect to sf yields equation (9a).
(9a) d
ds
W (MR MC )
CS
 sf
Fn fn f
f
f
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
The domestic government's maximization problem has a unique solution since its objective function
is strictly concave.  Differentiating the domestic firm's objective function with respect to sd yields
equation (9b).
 (9b)  
d
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w MR MC  CS
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d
  

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Concavity properties of the governments' objective functions are verified in the appendix.
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Proposition 5.  Moving from no regulation to National Treatment [with deterred entry, i.e.
when bd < h(bf)] will strictly increase domestic welfare and domestic quality.  Moving from
National Treatment (with deterred entry) to Mutual Recognition will strictly increase both qualities
and both regions' welfare.
           Proof.  The first results follow directly from Lemma 3 and Proposition 4.  For domestic
welfare to increase, domestic quality must be increased to compensate for the loss of domestic
consumer surplus due to the unavailability of the foreign product.
           For the comparison with Mutual Recognition, note that MRFf < MRf and CSDd/sd <
CSD/sd.  Comparing equations (7a) and (7b) with equations (9a) and (9b) shows then that the
domestic (foreign) standard best response under National Treatment (with deterred entry) must lie
everywhere below (to the left of) the standard best response under Mutual Recognition.  The quality
result follows.  A move from National Treatment (with deterred entry) to Mutual Recognition
without adjusting qualities and standards would strictly increase both regions' welfare by allowing
the foreign product to be sold in the domestic market.  Given that qualities are too low, the RHS of
both equations (7a) and (7b) are positive.  It follows that a gradual increase of sf up to the point
where the RHS of equation (7a) equals zero, i.e. a horizontal move to the right, will increase both
regions' welfare [domestic welfare increase follows from the properties of profits and consumer
surplus].  At this point, the foreign region is on its standard best response, but the domestic region is
below its standard best response.  The rest of the proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 3.
QED
5.  Comparing Regulatory Regimes
5.1.  Cost Advantage and Regulatory Preferences
The function g(bf)  introduced in Proposition 3 determines whether the domestic
government will prefer Mutual Recognition over Full Harmonization.  The function h(bf)
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introduced in Lemma 3 determines whether the domestic government will prefer to deter entry
under National Treatment.  Taken together, these two functions can be used to distinguish four
cases.  If the domestic cost advantage is "large", the domestic government deters entry under
National Treatment and prefers Mutual Recognition over all alternative regulatory regimes.  If the
domestic cost advantage is "small", the domestic government accommodates entry under National
Treatment and prefers Full Harmonization over all alternative regulatory regimes.  If domestic cost
advantage is "intermediate", the remaining two cases result.
The effects of alternative regulatory regimes relative to the case without regulation are
summarized in Table 1.  A decrease (an increase) of a particular variable is denoted by "-" ("+"),
whereas the question mark indicates that the direction of the effect could not be determined.  It is
noteworthy that Mutual Recognition unambiguously increases welfare and consumer surplus in
both regions as well as both qualities.  Furthermore, domestic welfare will increase for all
regulatory regimes including National Treatment, since the domestic government can choose
between accommodating and deterring entry.  Domestic quality and foreign consumer surplus
increase for all regulatory alternatives.
The domestic and foreign welfare rankings of alternative regimes under different cost situations are
shown in Table 2.  The numbers denote the rankings, where "1" is the choice leading to the highest
welfare, etc.  A "2" indicates that the precise rank ("2" or "3") could not be determined.  Note that
the foreign government prefers Mutual Recognition over all alternative regulatory regimes
regardless of relative cost.  Under National Treatment, the foreign government will never deter
entry by the domestic firm and has no direct influence on the domestic government's decision
concerning entry deterrence of the foreign firm.  Hence, the domestic government's preference will
determine, how the number of equilibria in the first-stage game changes when relative cost changes.
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Table 1.  Effects of Standards Under Different Regulatory Regimes
FH NTe* NTn* MR
W + + ? +
WD + + ? +
WF ? ? ? +
CSD + + ? +
CSF + + + +
PId - - ? -
PIf - - - -
sd + + + +
sf + + ? +
* NT: e = accommodated entry, n = deterred entry
Table 2.  Regulatory Preferences Under Different Cost Situations
bd Region FH NT* MR
< g(bf) & < h(bf) WD 2 2 1
* NT w/o entry WF 2 2 1
< g(bf)  & > h(bf) WD 2 3 1
* NT w/ entry WF 3 2 1
> g(bf) & < h(bf) WD 1 3 2
* NT w/o entry WF 2 2 1
> g(bf) & > h(bf) WD 1 2 2
* NT w/ entry WF 3 2 1
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5.2.  The Council's Decision
In the first stage of the game, governments (or their representatives) choose one regulatory
regime in the Council.  This regime is either chosen by unanimous vote or a default rule, namely
applying Mutual recognition, takes effect. Since the foreign government always prefers the default
rule Mutual Recognition, this is the only possible outcome of this game.  Note that even with a
different default rule, Mutual Recognition would remain a Nash equilibrium as long as bd  g(bf).
6.  Conclusions
This paper has shown that concerns about adverse consequences of minimum quality
standards might not be entirely valid.  Whether a particular region will gain or lose from the
introduction of a standard setting procedure depends on the procedure chosen.  Within the
framework of this model, welfare of the “foreign” region, measured as the sum of profits and
consumer surplus, will always be largest under Mutual Recognition.  This leads to Mutual
Recognition being the sole equilibrium outcome since it is the default procedure.  In particular, this
could indicate that the economically weaker members in the EU could be better off resisting the
harmonization of product standards in the Council of Ministers of the EU.  The “domestic” region’s
welfare will be largest under Mutual Recognition if its industry has a large cost advantage.  This
could indicate that Mutual Recognition of standards is more likely to prevail for industries with
large cost differences.
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where     bd = 0.4,  bf = 0.6;
              d         = firm d's quality best response;
              f          = firm f's quality best response;
              d(BM) = welfare-maximizing quality choice for firm d;
              f(BM)  = welfare-maximizing quality choice for firm f;
              f(FH)  = minimum quality standard under Full Harmonization;
              d(MR) = region D's quality standard under Mutual Recognition;
              f(MR)  = region F's quality standard under Mutual Recognition;
              f(NT)  = firm f's domestic-market-entry condition under National Treatment;
              NR      = No-Regulation quality equilibrium;
              BM      = Benchmark quality equilibrium;
              FH     = Full-Harmonization quality equilibrium;
              MR     = Mutual-Recognition quality equilibrium;
              NT     = National Treatment quality equilibrium.
Figure 1.  World Welfare and Quality Best Responses
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APPENDIX
All calculations are derived also in Lutz (1996)!
Price Competition
Let h and o stand for high and low quality, respectively.  Let tIk be the income parameter of
consumer k in region I; I = D, F. Recall that income parameters are uniformly distributed over the
intervals [0, uI]; I = D, F.  Define tIh = (pIh - pIo)/(sh - so) and tIo = pIo/so.  Consumers with tIk =
pIo/so will be indifferent between buying the low-quality product and not buying at all.  Consumers
with tIk = (pIh - pIo)/(sh - so) will be indifferent between buying either the low-quality or the high-
quality product.  Consumers with uI  tIk > tIh will buy the high-quality product, consumers with
tIh > tIk > tIo will buy the  low-quality product, and consumers with tIk < pIo/so will  not buy at all.
The demand functions for region I are then given by qIo = tIh - tIo and qIh = uI - tIh.  Assuming
uD=2 and uF=1, demands are:
(A.1a) q
p p
s s
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Dh Do
h o
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


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          Regional consumer surplus, CSI, is obtained by building the integrals of individual consumer
surplus functions over the segments  [tIh - tIo] and [uI - tIh] and adding up:
(A.2a) CS ts p dt ts p dtD h Dh
t
1
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           The profit of a particular firm is given by its revenues in both markets minus cost of
providing the chosen quality level.  Note that we assume bf > bd, i.e., the domestic firm can provide
quality at lower cost.  However, we do not yet know which firm will provide the higher quality.
Therefore, I refer generically to a high-quality and a low-quality firm until the firms' quality choices
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are determined.  Let i=h, o.  Then the profit function of the firm producing high quality is given by
PIh, whereas the profit function of the firm producing low quality is given by PIo:
(A.3a) PI p q (p , p ,s ,s ) p q (p , p ,s ,s ) k (s )h Dh Dh Dh Do h o Fh Fh Fh Fo h o h h  
(A.3b) PI p q (p , p ,s ,s ) p q (p , p ,s ,s ) k (s )o Do Do Dh Do h o Fo Fo Fh Fo h o o o  
           Each firm will have two first order conditions for price choice, obtained by setting the partial
derivatives of profit with respect to own prices in either market equal to zero, since markets are
segmented.  Solving these two equations simultaneously for the firm's own prices yields the price
reaction function for each firm.  Again, h and o denote high-quality and low-quality firm,
respectively.
(A.4a) p p 2s 2s
2Dh
Do h o

  ; (A.4b) p p s s
2Fh
Fo h o

 
(A.4c) p p s
2sDo
Dh o
h
 ; (A.4d) p p s
2sFo
Fh o
h

Because the markets are segmented, each firm's reaction function in either market is increasing in
the other firm's price in that market, but is independent of the price in the other market.  The high-
quality firm sets positive prices when the other firm's quality is zero, i.e. when there is a monopoly.
An increase (decrease) in quality offered by one firm lets both firms' reaction functions shift up
(down).  However, in the case of the high-quality firm these will be parallel shifts, whereas the low-
quality firm's reaction function rotates around the origin.  Deriving equilibrium prices as functions
of both firms' qualities will allow for immediate checking of the nonnegativity conditions on
quantities.  These conditions are derived in equations (9b) and (9d) below.  Prices have to lie in the
area spanned by these two functions for demands to be positive.  For zero-cost, this condition
coincides with the positive-profit condition.  An explicit derivation of nonnegative-profit conditions
will be introduced when discussing the firms' quality best responses.  It will be shown that when
firms choose profit-maximizing qualities their profits are always nonnegative in the neighborhood
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of the price equilibrium.   Note that nonnegative-profit conditions generally depend on conduct in
both markets  if prices are not set at their equilibrium values.
          Solving all four reaction functions simultaneously yields the following equilibrium
prices:
 (A.5)
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The second order conditions for price choice for the high-quality and the low-quality firm are given
in equations (8a) and (8b), respectively.  They are (locally) satisfied.
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           Consumers' positive-demand conditions are then given by:
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With both firms providing positive finite qualities and sh > so, conditions (A.7a) through (A.7d) are
always satisfied at the price equilibrium.
           Increases in high quality lead to increases in quality differentiation.  This gives the low-
quality provider the opportunity to increase price, even at unchanged quality offered.  The high-
quality provider increases price because quality offered was increased.  Increases in low quality lead
to decreases in quality differentiation.  Therefore, the high-quality provider has to decrease price.
For the low-quality provider the positive demand effect from increasing quality dominates the
negative differentiation effect initially which allows price increases in the beginning.  But as quality
differentiation becomes smaller price will eventually have to be reduced again.
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Quality Best Responses
To derive the firms’ quality best responses, we need to investigate each firm’s profit function, given
the other firm’s quality choice, and taking into account that both firms choose equilibrium prices.
This profit function will be a composite function, consisting of a segment where the firm is the low-
quality producer and another segment where the firm is the high-quality producer.  Firm i’s profit as
a function of own quality, si, is then given by:
(A.8)
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From either branch of equation (A.8), we can derive that profit will be equal to minus the
cost of providing quality when both qualities are equal.  But it is not entirely obvious that either
branch of equation (A.8) is concave in quality and has a local maximum.  To get this result, we
need only to demonstrate that revenues are concave.  Concavity of the profit function follows, since
cost of providing quality is convex.  Let RTt be firm i’s revenue in market T offering quality t,
where T=D, F and t=h, l.  These revenues are:
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Note that (A.9a) reduces to the monopoly revenues at sj = 0, i.e., when the low-quality firm does
not enter the market.
           Since RDj = 4 RFj (j = h, o), we can look at the properties of combined revenues in both
markets without much loss of generality.  Marginal revenues of firm i in both markets combined are
shown in equations (A.10).  They are denoted by MRt = Ri / si, where the subscripts indicate
again whether firm i is the high or the low quality provider:
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Equations (A.11) show the second derivatives of revenues with respect to own quality.  They are
denoted by MR2t, where MR2t = 2Ri / si2:
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Equations (A.10) and (A.11) establish that the two segments of the profit function are indeed
concave in quality.  The following are some additional properties of firm i’s revenue function,
which I will use extensively later on:
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Equations (A.12a) through (A.12d) describe properties of the total revenue function for both
markets.  These properties hold also if revenues in both markets are examined separately.  Figure
A.1 shows firm i’s profit as a function of its own quality offered, given its cost of providing quality,
bi (here equal to 0.5), and firm j’s quality.  The profit functions Pii1 and Pii2 are evaluated at sj =
0.2 and sj = 0.8, respectively.  Note that the profit functions have two local maxima – one in the
low-quality and one in the high-quality branch – and that they are kinked at si = sj.  As firm j’s
quality increases, firm i’s low-quality maximum profit increases whereas its high-quality maximum
profit decreases.  From equations (A.12a) and (A.12b) it immediately follows that an increase in
firm j’s quality will lead to an increase in firm i’s low-branch profit and a decrease in firm i’s high-
branch profit at any level of firm i’s quality.  Hence, the maximal profit attainable in each branch
will increase for the low branch and decrease for the high branch.  Furthermore, it is easy to show
that as firm j’s quality approaches zero, low-branch profits will approach zero whereas high-branch
profits will approach the monopoly profits.
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 It follows that firm i will choose high quality for sj between 0 and some sj* (the “switchpoint”),
will choose low quality for sj greater than sj*, and will switch from high quality to low quality at sj
= sj*.  The switchpoint sj* solves equation (A.13).
(A.13) max PI max PIs h s oi i
We are now able to determine the general shape of firm i’s quality best response.  First, it is obvious
that the high-quality branch starts with the monopoly choice of quality at sj = 0.  This choice is
shown in equation (A.14):
(A.14) s 5
8bi i

Firm i’s monopoly quality was calculated by solving its first-order conditions for quality choice for
the high-quality branch after setting sj = 0.  (Doing the same for the low- quality branch leads to a
hypothetical value of si = 0.)  These first-order conditions are given by equations (A.15a) and
(A.15b) for the high-quality and the low-quality branch, respectively:
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Applying the implicit function theorem to the first-order conditions for quality choice for both
branches, we can derive the slopes of both branches of the reaction function.  This slope is given by
dsi/dsj|t = -((Pit/si)/sj)/((Pit/si)/si), where Pit/si (t=h, l) are the left-hand sides  of
equations (A.15a) and (A.15b), respectively:
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In equations (A.16a) and (A.16b), the numerators are non-negative.  The denominators are always
greater than zero given that si is greater (smaller) than sj.  Hence, the reaction functions are upward
sloping.  In addition, the slopes of both reaction functions are less than one.
The effects of a change in cost of quality, represented by a change in bi, on the locations of
both branches of the quality best response, i.e.,  dsi/dbi|t = -( (Pit/si)/bi)/( (Pit/si)/si) are
given by equations (A.17a) and (A.17b):
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The numerators are clearly non-negative.  The denominators are always smaller than zero given that
si is greater (smaller) than sj!
Hence, the quality best response shifts downward as bi (or, the cost of providing quality)
increases.  Furthermore, it is easy to show that the switchpoint  sj*, i.e. that level of sj that solves
equation (A.13), is decreasing in bi.  Recall that Pit/bi = - 2 bi si, where si  sj for t=l and si  sj
for t=h.  However, we can ignore the case of si = sj since it clearly cannot be a maximizing choice
for either branch as long as positive profits are attainable.  Hence, |Pih/bi| > |Pio/bi| holds for
all relevant values of si, especially for those values that locally maximize the two respective
branches.  Now suppose that sj1 was a switchpoint at bi1, solving equation (A.13).  Let the quality
cost parameter increase to a level bi2 > bi1.  This will decrease the high-quality branch of profits
more than the low-quality branch.  Consequently, firm i will now prefer to be the low-quality
provider at sj1, i.e. it must have a new switch point sj2 < sj1.
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           Finally, we have to determine that firm i’s profits are nonnegative at each point on its quality
best response.  I will show that this is generally the case, i.e. along the quality best response firm i’s
profit is positive for all positive finite values of bi and sj.  The following are some properties
necessary to derive this result:
a.) Firm i’s profits decrease  monotonically along the high-quality branch of the quality best
response as sj is increased.  This follows directly from equations (A.12a), (A.12c), inequality
(A.16a) and the discussion above.
b.) Firm i’s profits at the low-quality branch, given any positive sj, are always positive at some si
close to zero.  This follows from a comparison of marginal revenue given in equation (A.10b)
with marginal cost of providing quality.  The limit  of marginal revenue minus marginal cost as
si  0 is a positive constant for all positive sj.
c.) Firm i’s profits increase  monotonically along the low-quality branch of the reaction function as
sj is increased.  This follows from equations (A.12b), (A.12d), inequality (A.16b) and the
discussion above.
d.) If firm i’s monopoly profits are positive, its profits at the switchpoint will be positive also.  This
follows directly from property b), equations (A.12a) and (A.12b), and the discussion above.
           Properties a) and c) establish that profits as a function of optimal response quality attain a
global minimum at the switchpoint.  Properties b) and d) establish that this global minimum will be
positive if monopoly profits are positive.  Hence, a sufficient condition for generally positive profits
along firm i’s reaction function is that its monopoly profits are positive, which is generally true for
finite bi.  Figure A.2 shows firm i’s best quality response together with its isoprofit curves at cost of
providing quality bi = 0.4.  Firm i’s profit decreases  when moving from the origin along the 45-
degree line.  From any point on the 45-degree line, profits increase when moving to the left or right.
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Market Equilibria in Quality
           The market equilibria in pure strategies without government intervention are simply given by
the intersections of the quality best responses.  Generally, there will be two pure-strategy equilibria
as long as firms are not too different with respect to cost of providing quality. This is illustrated in
Figure A.3.  (Note that in this case, there generally exists at least one non degenerate mixed-strategy
equilibrium also.  However, the following analysis covers only pure-strategy equilibria.)
           Figure A.3 shows the quality best responses of two different firms i and j, Rqi1 and Rqi2,
evaluated at {bi, bj} = {0.4, 0.6}.  The intersections e1 and e2 are two pure-strategy equilibria.
For the purpose of this study, I want to concentrate on asymmetric pure-strategy equilibria
where the low-cost firm provides high quality, i.e. cases described by e1 in Figure A.3.  With
respect to the basic model, this means that the domestic firm provides high quality, whereas the
foreign firm provides low quality.  This case arises naturally if firms’ costs of providing quality are
sufficiently different.  Starting from the situation depicted in Figure A.3, firm j’s quality best
response RQj will shift to the left as its cost parameter bj was increased.  If bj is high relative to bi,
the high-quality branch of firm j’s quality best response is too low to intersect with the low-quality
branch of firm i’s quality best response.  Since sj is everywhere lower than firm i’s switchpoint, the
only remaining pure-strategy equilibrium would be given by e1.  However, it may not be very
realistic to assume large cost differences among firms.  Another way to ensure a unique equilibrium
is to make the somewhat plausible assumption that firm f faces a technological constraint of the
form sf  sfmax ( in other words, kf(sf) is infinite for all sf > sfmax), where sfmax is smaller than
firm d’s switchpoint.  This condition is given by equation (A.18).
(A.18) s sf f
max


Again, the only remaining (pure-strategy) equilibrium would be given by e1.  In addition, the high-
quality branch of firm j’s quality best response would be horizontal at sjmax and firm j’s
switchpoint would be smaller than without this constraint.  Recall that, without a constraint, firms
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increase their own quality to partly offset decreases in profits as they move along their reaction
function’s high-quality branch.  Since firm j faces a technological constraint, it can not increase its
quality as firm i’s quality increases.  Hence its profit will decrease faster and it will reach the
switchpoint earlier.  However, it is not necessary for e1 to exist that firm j makes positive profits at
sjmax at all.  If the condition in equation (A.19) below is not satisfied, firm j’s quality best response
will consist of a low-quality branch only.
(A.19) s 5
4bj
max
h

Proof of Lemma 1
Regional welfare is just the sum of regional consumer surplus and the profit of the firm
located in that region.  Total welfare is then the sum of the welfare in both regions.  Although
welfare can only be calculated after determining which firm provides high quality and which
provides low quality, some welfare results can be obtained that hold in either quality equilibrium.
           It can be shown that both governments prefer higher quality levels than those chosen in a
market equilibrium.  The following properties of consumer surplus in either region will be used to
show this.
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The expressions in equations (A.20a) are strictly positive for any pair of qualities chosen in a
market equilibrium.  This is so, since a market equilibrium requires the low-quality firm's marginal
revenue to be positive, which is only the case if so < 4sh/7.  In both regions, an increase of either
quality will lead to increases of consumer surplus at increasing rates.  This leads to the result in
Lemma 1.
           Lemma 1.  a) Given an unregulated quality equilibrium, regional welfare of both regions can
be increased by increasing either or both qualities.
           b) There exists a single standard that, if imposed in both regions, would increase welfare of
both regions.
           Proof.  a) For any pair of qualities chosen in a market equilibrium, marginal profits of both
firms are zero, whereas marginal consumer surplus in both regions with respect to both qualities is
positive.  See equations (A.20a) through (A.21b) and note that by equation (A.10b), so < 4sh/7 is a
necessary condition for marginal profits of the low-quality firm to be equal to zero.
           b) If a standard were set slightly above low quality in the unregulated equilibrium, it would
be binding for the low-quality provider, but not for the high-quality provider.  Since by inequality
(A.16a), the high-quality provider's quality best response is increasing in low quality, both qualities
will increase.  The welfare result follows then from part a). QED
Concavity of the Foreign Firm's Profits under Full Harmonization
Equation (A.22) is the second-order partial derivative of the foreign firm's profits along the
domestic firm's quality best response.  It shows that foreign firm's profits are concave in foreign
quality.
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Effects on Consumer Surplus under Full Harmonization
 uniform minimum quality standard will make all consumers in both regions weakly better off and
some consumers strictly better off.  Let i= D, F, uD=2, and uF=1.  In region i, consumers with
incomes in the segment [ui, tih] will purchase high quality, consumers with incomes in the segment
[tih, til] will purchase low quality, and all other consumers will not purchase.  Let the slope of firm
d's quality best response be denoted by dsd/dsf .  Equations (A.23b) and (A.23d) show that market
participation in both regions will increase.  Equations (A.23a) and (A.23c) show that the segment of
consumers buying high quality will increase in both markets.  Equations (A.23b), (A.23d), (A.23e),
and (A.23f) show that utility per unit bought will increase in both regions for both qualities.
(A.23a)
   
d
ds
t 4s
4s s
4s
4s s
ds
ds
0
f
Dd
d
d f
2
f
d f
2
d
f


 

 

(A.23b)
   
d
ds
t d
ds
p
s
6s
4s s
6s
4s s
ds
ds
0
f
Df
f
Df
f
d
d f
f
d f
2
d
f
 

 

 

(A.23c)
   
d
ds
t 2s
4s s
2s
4s s
ds
ds
0
f
Fd
d
d f
2
f
d f
2
d
f


 

 

(A.23d)
   
d
ds
t d
ds
p
s
3s
4s s
3s
4s s
ds
ds
0
f
Ff
f
Ff
f
d
d f
2
f
d f
2
d
f
 

 

 

(A.23e)
   
d
ds
p
s
12s
4s s
12s
4s s
ds
ds
0
f
Dd
d
d
d f
2
f
d f
2
d
f


 

 

(A.23f)
   
d
ds
p
s
6s
4s s
6s
4s s
ds
ds
0
f
Fd
d
d
d f
2
f
d f
2
d
f


 

 

Lutz, ”International Coordination of Quality Standards...,“ Appendix 13
Concavity of the Council's Objective Function under Full Harmonization
Equation (A.24) is the second-order condition of maximizing world welfare along the domestic
quality best response.  The Council's objective function has a single extremum at which it is locally
strictly concave in sf.  It can be shown that the Council's objective function becomes concave for all
sf higher than its unrestricted equilibrium value if bf is "sufficiently high."
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Foreign Profit is Negative at Full Harmonization
Foreign zero-profit cost, Cf|0, is just equal to revenue.  According to equation (6), MCf > MRf +
∂CSF/∂sf + ∂Rd/∂sf + ∂CSD/∂sf at Full Harmonization.  Hence, Cf > (MRf + ∂CSF/∂sf + ∂Rd/∂sf +
∂CSD/∂sf)sf/2.  It follows that Cf > Cf|0.
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Concavity of Governments' Objective Functions under Mutual Recognition
The foreign government's objective function is globally concave.  The domestic government's
objective function has a single extremum at which it is locally strictly concave in sd.  This can be
verified by differentiating equations (7a) and (7b) with respect to qualities:
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Let sd be the welfare-maximizing choice of the domestic government, i.e. the RHS of equation (7b)
equals zero.  Then, equation (A.26b) becomes:
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Proof of Lemma 2
Lemma 2.  Define a benchmark as the result of maximizing the sum of regional welfares,
W, with respect to both qualities subject to subsequent price competition.
           a) At Full Harmonization, WD/sd = CSD/sd > 0.  Any horizontal move to the left (any
reduction in sf without reducing sd) will always leave WD/sd > 0.
           b) Compared to the benchmark, Full Harmonization will result in domestic quality being too
low and foreign quality being too high.
           c) Compared to the benchmark, Mutual Recognition will result in both domestic and foreign
quality being too low.
Proof.   Let world welfare be denoted by W and firm d's marginal quality best response be
denoted by dsd/dsf.  See below for the rest of the proof of part a).
           b) Under Full Harmonization, W/sd = CSD/sd + Rf/sd + CSF/sd > 0 and W/sf =
- dsd/dsf(CSD/sd + Rf/sd + CSF/sd) < 0 hold since the RHS of equation (6) is equal to zero.
Hold sd constant at the Full-Harmonization level and decrease sf until W/sf = 0.  At this point,
W/sd = WD/sd + Rf/sd + CSF/sd > 0 by part a).  It follows that sd is too low.  Hold sf
constant at the Full-Harmonization level.  Then for any  sd, W/sf < 0 holds.  It follows that sf is
too high.
           c) Under Mutual Recognition, W/sd = Rf/sd + CSF/sd > 0 and W/sf = CSD/sf +
Rd/sf > 0 hold since the RHS of equations (7a) and (7b) are equal to zero. QED
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Calculations for Proof of Lemma 2
a) At Full Harmonization, ∂WD/∂sd =∂CSD/∂sd > 0.  Let sd|MR and sd|FH be sd at the Mutual
Recognition solution and the Full Harmonization solution, respectively.  I establish that a horizontal
move to the left (reduction in sf without reducing sd) will always leave ∂WD/∂sd > 0, i.e. sd|MR >
sd|FH must hold.  Equation (A.8a) shows ∂WD/∂sd at {sdsd|FH, sfx0} calculated as its value
at Full Harmonization minus the loss from reducing sf to x0.  It is positive for all x0  sf if sf  
0.77*sd.  It can be shown that the condition on sf is satisfied for any Full Harmonization
equilibrium.  First, note that any Full Harmonization solution must be to the left of the domestic
firm's switchpoint, i.e. sd|FH must be less than sd at the switchpoint.  (If this was not satisfied, the
domestic firm would want to be the low-quality producer with a quality lower than the chosen
minimum quality standard.)  Since sf/sd increases along the domestic quality best response as sf
increases, sf   0.77*sd holds at the Full Harmonization solution since it holds at the domestic
firm's switchpoint.  This can be verified by deriving an upper bound for the switchpoint expressed
in terms of its high-quality best response.
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b) Let firm d's marginal quality best response be denoted by dsd/dsf.  Denote MCf and sf at the
Full-Harmonization solution as MCf|FH and sf|FH, respectively.  Define MCf|BM = (MRf +
∂CSF/∂sf + ∂Rd/∂sf + ∂CSD/∂sf).  MCf|FH = (MRf + ∂CSF/∂sf + ∂Rd/∂sf + ∂CSD/∂sf) +
dsd/dsf*(MRd - MCd + ∂CSF/∂sd + ∂Rf/∂sd + ∂CSD/∂sd) where MRd = MCd holds.  At the
benchmark, MCf|FH > MCf|BM.  MCf|BM is increasing in sd and approaches a finite limit as sd
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approaches infinity.  MCf|FH is  always greater than this limit.  It follows that MCf|FH > (MRf +
∂CSF/∂sf + ∂Rd/∂sf + ∂CSD/∂sf) for any sd > 0.
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Inspection of equation (A.27c) shows that the limit of MCf|BM as sd approaches infinity is equal to
25/32.
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Derivation of the Cost Condition g(bf) for Proposition 3
Define g(bf) = {bd | WD|MR(bd, bf) =  WD|FH(bd, bf)}.  The domestic region will prefer Mutual
Recognition if bd <  g(bf).  From equations (6) and (7a), we have that for any finite bd the limits of
sf|MR and sf|FH as bf approaches infinity are equal to zero.  Hence the limit of ( WD|MR -
WD|FH) as bf approaches infinity is equal to (( WD|MR -  WD|FH)|sf = 0) = (( WD|MR -
WD|NR)|sf = 0) > 0 (by equation (7b)).
For any {bd, bf}, a decrease in bf will increase sf more under FH than under MR (by equations (6)
and (7a)).  Let dWD/dsf|MR and dWD/dsf|FH be the effect of a change in sf at MR and FH,
respectively.  Note that ∂Rd/∂sf + ∂CSD/∂sf is less at MR than at FH, since sd is larger and sf is
smaller at MR than at FH.  It follows that dWD/dsf|MR = ∂Rd/∂sf + ∂CSD/∂sf <dWD/dsf|FH =
∂Rd/∂sf + ∂CSD/∂sf + dsd/dsf*∂CSD/∂sd.  Hence, a decrease in bf will  decrease ( WD|MR -
WD|FH).
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Proof of Lemma 4
Lemma 4.  Under National Treatment (with accommodated entry), the foreign government
will calculate foreign profits at the foreign welfare maximum along the domestic firm's quality best
response, say PIf|MF.  It will then set a standard such that PIf|FH < PIfn  PIf|MF.
           Proof. By equations (8a-3) and (8b), domestic welfare along firm d's quality best
response is steadily increasing in foreign quality, whereas foreign welfare along firm d's
quality best response is maximized at a point, say MF, to the right of NR and to the left of FH.
At MF, foreign profits are nonnegative and decreasing in foreign quality.  Furthermore, by
Proposition 1, foreign profits are negative at FH.  The foreign government sets a standard
such that foreign profits with deterred entry are as close as possible to foreign profits with
accommodated entry at MF.  It can choose a standard such that foreign profits with deterred
entry are positive. QED
Derivation of the Cost Condition h(bf) for Proposition 5
Define h(bf) = {bd | WD|NTn(bd, bf) = WD|NTe(bd, bf)}.  The domestic region will prefer to deter
entry if bd <  g(bf).  From equations (8a-1) through (9a), we have that for any finite bd the limits of
sf|NTn and sf|NTe as bf approaches infinity are equal to zero.  Hence the limit of (WD|NTn -
WD|NTe) as bf approaches infinity is equal to ((WD|NTn - WD|NTe)|sf = 0) = ((WD|MR -
WD|NR)|sf = 0) > 0 (by equation (7a)).
For any {bd, bf}, an increase in bf will decrease sf under both NTn and NTe.  This will
increase MRd in equation (9b) leading to an increase in sd and WD|NTn.  WD|NTe decreases, since
sd is forced down the domestic quality best response.  Consequently, (WD|NTn - WD|NTe)
increases.  Similarly, (WD|NTn - WD|NTe) decreases with a decrease in bf.
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Concavity of Governments' Objective Functions under National Treatment (Entry Deterred)
The domestic government's objective function is globally concave.  The foreign government's
objective function has a single extremum at which it is locally strictly concave in sf.  This can be
verified by differentiating equations (9b) and (9a) with respect to qualities:
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Let sf be the welfare-maximizing choice of the foreign government, i.e. the RHS of equation (9a)
equals zero.  Then, we have:
(A.28b)
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An Example Where Entry Occurs Under National Treatment
           This example shows a case where both regions prefer Mutual Recognition over all their
available alternatives and the domestic region would not deter entry under National Treatment.  The
numerical results are summarized in Table A.1.  Figure 4 shows firms' quality best responses and
governments' standard best responses against the background of isowelfare curves for both regions
together.  The domestic firm has a cost advantage, i.e. bd = 0.4 < 0.6 = bf.  Since h(bf) < bd < g(bf),
entry occurs under National Treatment, but both regions prefer Mutual Recognition over all other
alternatives.  Comparisons with domestic and foreign isowelfare curves, respectively, are shown in
Lutz (1996).  (A case where the domestic region would prefer Full Harmonization over Mutual
Recognition would be given, e.g., with bd = 0.5 < 0.6 = bf.)
Under National Treatment, the domestic government accommodates entry.  The foreign
government sets a non-binding standard and the domestic government sets a standard above the
foreign quality level in the unregulated  equilibrium.  Both qualities, consumer surplus, the number
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of customers served, and domestic welfare are increased, while profits will decrease.  Foreign
welfare is increased.
           Under Full Harmonization, a global minimum quality standard is set substantially above the
unregulated foreign quality level (and still above the foreign quality level under National
Treatment).  The domestic firm's quality choice is above the unregulated case and the case of
National Treatment.  Profits of both firms are decreased below the levels at National Treatment (the
foreign firm's unsubsidized profits are negative).  National welfare of the domestic region is
increased beyond the level at National Treatment, national welfare of the foreign region is lower
than in the unregulated case, and total welfare is higher than under National Treatment. Under
Mutual Recognition, the domestic government sets a binding minimum quality standard above the
unregulated domestic quality level and above the chosen domestic quality levels under National
Treatment and under Full Harmonization.  The foreign government sets a binding standard above
the unregulated foreign quality level (but below the optimal standard under National Treatment and
under Full Harmonization).  Profits of both firms are decreased (but less than under National
Treatment and Full Harmonization).  The number of customers served in both regions increases
(but less than under National Treatment and under Full Harmonization).  Consumer surplus in both
regions increases more than under National Treatment but less than under Full Harmonization.
Table A.1 and Figure 4 present numerical results under no regulation (NR), the benchmark
case (BM), National Treatment (NT, with accommodated entry), Full Harmonization (FH) and
Mutual Recognition (MR).
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Table A.1.  Outcomes Under Different Regulatory Regimes - An Example
            NR       BM       NT       FH       MR
sd        1.573    2.351    1.607    1.698    2.187
sf        0.219    0.620    0.432    0.744    0.419
sd-sf     1.354    1.731    1.175    0.954    1.768
pDd      1.403    1.853    1.259    1.072    1.857
pDf       0.098    0.244    0.169    0.235    0.178
pFd       0.701    0.927    0.630    0.536    0.928
pFf       0.049    0.122    0.085    0.117    0.089
tDd       0.964    0.929    0.928    0.877    0.950
tDf       0.446    0.394    0.392    0.316    0.425
tFd       0.482    0.465    0.464    0.439    0.475
tFf       0.223    0.197    0.196    0.158    0.212
qDd       1.036    1.071    1.072    1.123    1.050
qDf       0.518    0.535    0.536    0.561    0.525
qFd       0.518    0.535    0.536    0.561    0.525
qFf       0.259    0.268    0.268    0.281    0.263
PId       0.827    0.269    0.655    0.351    0.525
PIf       0.034   -0.067    0.002   -0.167    0.011
CSD       0.991    1.791    1.233    1.656    1.495
CSF       0.248    0.448    0.308    0.414    0.374
WD        1.818    2.060    1.888    2.008    2.020
WF        0.282    0.381    0.310    0.247    0.385
W         2.101    2.441    2.198    2.255    2.405
(bd = 0.4,  bf = 0.6)
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Effects of Changing Assumptions about Relative Costs and Market Sizes
Assumptions about market sizes are embedded in the specification of demands, i.e. t ~ U[0,
uD] in the domestic region and t ~ U[0, uF] in the foreign region, where uD = 2uF = 2.  A specific
assumption about costs is that bd < bf.  In addition, it is assumed that relative costs are such that
only one Nash equilibrium results where the domestic firm produces high quality.
The existence of the unregulated equilibrium where the low-cost producer produces high
quality is independent of relative cost.  For identical costs and when the cost difference is not to
large, i.e. when bf/bd is close to 1, there will always be two equilibria.  The second equilibrium,
where the high-cost producer produces high quality will vanish if bf/bd gets much larger or much
smaller than one or if one firm is unable to provide any quality higher than its competitor’s
switchpoint quality (faces infinite cost of providing that quality).  The location of quality best
responses depends on the firms’ own costs and on combined market size in both regions.  Relative
market size does not matter as long as combined market size is constant.  (Note that profit and
revenue are functions of combined market size only.)  Combined market size is measured as uD2 +
uF2.  The relative location of quality best responses is even independent of combined market size
and depends only on relative costs.
It follows that the welfare results of Lemma 1 are independent of bd, bf, uD, and uF.
However, with two pure-strategy equilibria, standards could be used to prohibit one of them.  This
would alter the game between governments.  Hence the maintained assumption of a unique market
equilibrium without regulation is nontrivial.
The effects of changing any of the parameters bd, bf, uD, or uF on results about alternative
minimum quality standard arrangements (conditional on the uniqueness of the equilibrium in the
industry subgame) can be illustrated using Figure 4.  In Figure 4, the relative locations of the
equilibria without regulation (NR), under National Treatment with accommodated entry (NT),
under Full Harmonization (FH), and under Mutual Recognition (MR), and the benchmark solution
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(FB) are not significantly altered by changes in either of the four parameters.  More specifically, the
domestic standard best response under Mutual Recognition d(MR) will always lie above the
domestic firm’s quality best response d.  Similarly, f(MR) will always lie to the right of f.  The
benchmark quality choices d(BM) and f(BM) lie always above d(MR) and to the right of f(MR),
respectively.  Furthermore, NT will always lie on d to the right of f(MR) and FH will always lie on
d to the right of NT.  The comparison of National Treatment with deterred entry and Mutual
Recognition cannot be shown in Figure 4, but an analogous generalization holds.  The domestic
(foreign) standard best response under Mutual Recognition will always lie above (to the right of)
the domestic (foreign) standard best response under National Treatment with deterred entry.
The results establishing when the domestic region prefers MR over FH, MR over NT with
accommodated entry, and NT with deterred entry over NT with accommodated entry depend on a
relative cost condition in addition to the properties listed above.  They are based an constant relative
market size.  With either a decrease in relative cost or an increase in relative market size, the
domestic region is more likely to prefer MR over FH, MR over NT with accommodated entry, and
NT with deterred entry over NT with accommodated entry.  Other results hold generally, since they
are independent of relative cost and relative market size.  These are, in particular, the result
establishing that Mutual Recognition improves welfare of both regions when compared to the
unregulated case, and the result that the foreign region prefers Mutual Recognition over all
available alternatives.
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Figure A.3. Quality Equilibria - Different Firms
